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DISSENT IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: DISCORD IN
SERVICE OF HARMONY
MATTHEW P. BERGMAN*
Judicial dissent is a practice deeply rooted in Anglo-American juris-
prudence. Except for a brief period during the first years of John Mar-
shall's tenure as ChiefJustice, dissent has been a regular component of
Supreme Court decision making. Over this period, many dissenting
opinions have later been adopted by subsequent Supreme Court majori-
ties as the law of the land. Even when not adopted, dissents strengthen
the quality of a court's jurisprudence by providing a theoretical counter-
principle with which the court must contend. While dissenting opinions
may destroy public perceptions ofjudicial infallibility, they also provide
living proof of the independence, fairness and conscientiousness of the
judiciary.
INTRODUCTION
After an arduous morning of oral argument, a three-member panel
ofjudges was deliberating over the disposition of a particularly difficult
appeal. The presiding judge turned to his junior colleague and ex-
claimed: "Frank, this case is frivolous! We must affirm the lower
court." "Oh no, Chief," replied the junior judge, "I cannot possibly
vote to do that!" "Oh well," smiled the Chief, "you're entitled to be
mistaken." He then turned to his more experienced colleague: "Law-
rence, surely you agree that we must affirm?" "I'm afraid not Chief,"
said Lawrence, "I emphatically agree with Frank that we must reverse."
"Well, then," snorted the presiding judge, "the case will be affirmed;
you two argue between yourselves who will write the dissent!"'
The last term of the United States Supreme Court produced a wind-
fall of far-reaching decisions touching on diverse areas of social life in-
cluding first amendment limitations on political protest 2 and
patronage,3 the respective rights of parents and their children regarding
abortion,4 religious activity in public schools5 and the right to die. 6 In
each of these disparate cases, the Court's opinion has been accompanied
by a forceful dissent. While some of these dissents may be attributed to
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit; Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, J.D. (1989),
Reed College, B.A. (1986).
I. This dialogue is based on the dialogue which appeared in Brennan, In Defense of
Dissents, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 427, 429 (1986).
2. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
3. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
4. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
5. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (8 to 1 decision).
6. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
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the passing of the ideological old guard, 7 dissent cannot be explained
entirely by the liberal-conservative split on the Supreme Court.8 To ap-
preciate the habit of dissent on the Rehnquist Court, contemporary dis-
sent must be viewed relative to its historical and jurisprudential
foundations.
I. JUDICIAL DISSENT IN AMERICA
In colonial America, the courts of last resort from decisions of
American courts and British common law courts were the Privy Council
and the House of Lords. 9 However, most appeals were concluded in
one of the common law courts with subordinate appellate jurisdiction. 10
All published opinions of those tribunals were written seriatim; meaning
that each judge wrote out his individual rationale for deciding the
case."I It was these reports of the common law courts to which colonial
lawyers had access and it was the judicial practice of seriatim opinions
with which lawyers were most familiar.
12
Based on this colonial experience, the United States Supreme Court
continued the practice of seriatim opinions in the early days of the Re-
public. Each justice delivered an unabashedly individual response to
each case.13 Thus, the first reported case of the Supreme Court, Georgia
v. Brailsford,14 contained holdings by Justices Johnson and Cushing con-
trary to the decision reached by Chief Justice Jay, and Justices Wilson,
Blair and Iredell. This practice continued in other early Supreme Court
cases. 
15
The ascendancy of ChiefJustice Marshall in 1801 marked an abrupt
7. Ray,Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REv., 307 (1988).
8. Justice Brennan's opinion in United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990),
struck down a federal law banning flag desecration on first amendment grounds. Justice
Brennan was joined by conservative stalwarts Scalia and Kennedy, while the dissent was
written by Justice Stevens, usually perceived as a centrist.
9. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A Histoy ofJudicial Disintegration, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 186, 187 (1959).
10. Id. at 190.
11. Dissenting votes of Privy Council members were kept secret while in the House of
Lords, the lower appellate court, each judge stated the reasoning behind his judgment
either orally or in writing. Simpson, Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PENN. L. REv. 205, 207
(1923). The House of Lords apparently followed the early Germanic and Roman proce-
dure whereby judgments were arrived at in public. See Nadelman, The Judicial Dissent: Publi-
cation vs. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415 (1959).
12. ZoBell, supra note 9, at 191. Referring to the Kings Bench, Thomas Jefferson
wrote:
[F]rom the earliest ages of English law, from the date of the year-books, at least,
to the end of the Ild George, the judges of England in all but self-evident cases,
delivered their opinions seriatim, with the reason and authorities which governed
their decisions.... Besides the light which their separate arguments threw on the
subject... it shewed whether the judges were unanimous or divided, and gave
accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a precedent.
Id. at 190.
13. See Ray, supra note 7, at 308.
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
15. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfari, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14 (1800); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 419 (1793). But see Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 365, 367 (1797) (ChiefJustice
Elsworth delivered the opinion of the court without other options).
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end to the practice of seriatim opinions. In one of many "significant acts
of audacity ... which made his career historic,"' 6 Marshall terminated
the practice of seriatim opinions delivering the Court's opinion himself in
Talbot v. Seeman.17 Thus, in the early years of the Marshall Court, the
Supreme Court wrote as a single unit; all dissension from the Court's
holding remained secret.18 However, Marshall's challenge to the estab-
lished tradition of seriatim opinions was not met with universal accord.
Those opposed to the Marshall Court's expansion of federal power were
among the most strenuous critics of the new practice.' 9 President Jef-
ferson criticized the Court's unanimous holdings as:
An opinion.., huddled up in a conclave, perhaps by a majority
of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquies-
cence of lax or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who
sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own
reasoning.20
While Chief Justice Marshall's practice of delivering unanimous
opinions was revolutionary, it was also short-lived. A scant four years
after Marshall's ascendancy, JusticeJohnson separately concurred in the
Court's opinion in Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass.2' Once broken, Mar-
shall's rule of unanimity lost its sway over his colleagues and dissent was
once again seen in the Supreme Court. Marshall himself authored nine
dissents and one special concurrence 22 and his dissent in Ogden v. Saun-
ders23 is widely viewed as his judicial masterpiece. 24 However, Mar-
shall's focus on judicial unity remained prevalent throughout his tenure
and dissents rarely were published in more than fifteen percent of the
cases decided in a given term.2
5
A new era of judicial dissent began with the appointment of Roger
Taney as Chief Justice.26 Following Justice Johnson's example, Justice
Curtis assumed the dissenter's mantle, authoring the sole dissent in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.2 7 Dred Scott was the most famous dissent of the Taney
era, an era which was typified by deep conflicts over fundamental philos-
ophies.28 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Court was en-
livened by a series of dissenting opinions by Justices Harlan, Miller and
Field.29 Justice Field became famous for his dissents in the Slaughter-
16. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919).
17. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 25 (1801).
18. This was an important precondition for the Court's deft assumption of power in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), wherein Marshall established the consti-
tutional principle of judicial review.
19. ZoBell, supra note 9, at 194.
20. Id. (quoting letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), reprinted in 12 FORD, THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175 (1905)).
21. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (Johnson, J., concurring).
22. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 196.
23. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1987) (Marshall, CJ., dissenting).
24. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1928).
25. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 196.
26. See Ganoe, The Passing of the Old Dissent, 21 OR. L. REV. 285, 286 (1942).
27. 60 U.S. (12 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
28. See Ganoe, supra note 26, at 286.
29. See generally id. at 287.
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House Cases30 and Munn v. Illinois,3 1 while Harlan became a "judicial
folk-hero" for his lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.
3 2
In the early twentieth century, Supreme Court dissenting opinions
became more common. Under the leadership ofJustice Holmes, dissent
was fully legitimized and even surrounded with an aura of romance.
3 3
Much of Holme's fame is derived from his reputation as a dissenting
justice,3 4 despite the fact that he authored only half as many dissents as
Justice Harlan.3 5 Unlike Harlan, however, Holmes lived to see many of
his dissents become majority opinions.
36
The habit ofjudicial dissent intensified in the early years of Franklin
Roosevelt's second administration. With the departure of conservative
stalwarts Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler and McReynolds, many ex-
pected a more unified Court.3 7 However, dissents increased throughout
the Roosevelt presidency and in the years following. Today, dissent re-
mains an integral part of the Supreme Court's adjudication. If history is
any guide, the prevalence of dissent is unlikely to diminish despite the
growing conservative consensus on the Supreme Court. While judicial
dissent may be decried by some as ajudicial institution, it is here to stay.
II. THE FUNCTION OF DISSENT
A. Appealing to Future Generations
The hope of every dissenting judge is that today's dissent will be-
come tomorrow's majority opinion. Dissenting opinions sow the seeds
for subsequent majorities, providing a "wholesome element" for the
growth of the law.3 8 In the words of Chief Justice Hughes:
A dissent ... is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may pos-
sibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes
the court to have been betrayed.3 9
Although dissenting opinions are usually relegated to the dustbin ofju-
dicial history, there exist many examples of dissenting opinions which
were subsequently adopted.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson40 stands among the
most prophetic in American judicial history. Eight Justices joined in the
Court's opinion which upheld forced racial separation as constitutional,
"social" (as opposed to "political") discrimination.4 ' Justice Harlan
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (FieldJ., dissenting).
31. 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
32. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Ray, supra note 7, at 310.
34. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 201.
35. Ray, supra note 11, at 310.
36. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 202.
37. See, e.g., Ganoe, supra note 26, at 288.
38. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43
HARV. L. REV. 33, 47 (1929).
39. HUGHES, supra note 24, at 68.
40. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
41. Id. at 544.
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cast the sole opposing vote. In an eloquent appeal to future genera-
tions, he urged that the folly of his contemporaries be undone:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The hum-
blest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color
when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
land are involved.
4 2
It took sixty years for Harlan's vision of the fourteenth amendment to
prevail, but in Brown v. Board of Education,4 3 his view was vindicated by a
unanimous Supreme Court.
In Lochner v. New York, 44 the Supreme Court struck down a state
regulation which limited the work hours for bakery employees. The
Court found the statute to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free-
dom of contract.4 5 Justice Holmes castigated the majority for legislating
social Darwinism from the judicial bench:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics .... [A] Constitution is not intended to em-
body a particular economic theory.... It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shock-
ing ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
46
The searing dissent of Justice Holmes laid the groundwork for the
Court's subsequent retreat from substantive due process and became
the majority view within six years.
4 7
Another dissent later adopted as the law of the land was that of
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.48 In Olmstead, the Court held
that contents of telephone conversations surreptitiously apprehended
were not subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
Justice Brandeis's dissent went beyond the particulars of the case and
articulated an eloquent defense of individual rights which today contin-
ues to evoke the attention of constitutional scholars and lay individuals
alike.
42. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. Significantly, the Court's reasoning in Lochner was derived from Justice Field's dis-
senting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (Field, J.
dissenting), and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J. dissenting) in which
Justice Field castigated the Court for its subordination of substantive due process rights to
the economic regulation of the states. See generally Bloch, The Value of Dissent, LAw & Soc'y
J. 7, 8 (November 1930, February 1931).
46. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (state regulation of work hours does
not violate due process).
48. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Gov-
ernment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a
violation of the Fifth.
49
While Justice Brandeis failed to carry the day, his reasoning ultimately
prevailed in Berger v. New York 50 and Katz v. United States.5 1
In Betts v. Brady,52 the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants
were not constitutionally entitled to counsel in non-capital cases. Justice
Black vehemently dissented from the court's reasoning:
A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamen-
tal ideas of fairness and right,' which subjects innocent men to
increased dangers of conviction merely because of their pov-
erty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a
trial in which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible
to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the
defendant's case was adequately presented.
53
Twenty-one years later in Gideon v. Wainwright,5 4 Justice Black had the
uncommon pleasure of living to see his dissent become the opinion of
the Court. In fact, he had the opportunity to author the opinion himself.
A final example of a dissenting opinion becoming the law of future
generations is Justice Douglas's dissent in Dennis v. United States.5 5 Den-
nis arose out of the prosecution of several Communist leaders under the
Smith Act.5 6 The Supreme Court upheld portions of the Smith Act
which prescribed penalties for "advocating" the overthrow of the
United States government. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that be-
cause there was no clear and present danger that the defendants' advo-
cacy would result in violence, such advocacy was protected by the first
amendment.
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the
high service it has given our society. Its protection is essential
to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas re-
49. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
51. 380 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
53. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2835 (1989).
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leases pressures which otherwise might become destructive.
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free
discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full
and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the test-
ing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free
discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unpre-
pared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civiliza-
tions apart.5
7
Six years later, Justice Douglas's view of the first amendment was largely
vindicated in Yates v. United States,58 wherein the Supreme Court recog-
nized the distinction "between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advo-
cacy directed at promoting unlawful action. .... 59
These cases are only some of the more famous examples ofjudicial
dissents which were subsequently adopted as the opinion of the Court.
Significantly, most of these now-famous dissents did not command wide-
spread attention or support at the time they were written. Their "great-
ness" was left for future generations to determine. Consequently, it is
impossible to know today which dissenting opinions will be venerated
tomorrow and which will be relegated to deserved obscurity. If courts
are to preserve the opportunity for future generations to learn from
their mistakes by adopting the reasoning of their dissenting colleagues,
they must preserve all dissenting opinions and leave to their successors
the task of sorting the wheat from the chaff.
B. Counter-Principle to the Majority's Reasoning
While every dissenting judge hopes that his reasoning will be
adopted by subsequent generations, most dissents never become the
law. EvenJustice Holmes, "the great dissenter," did not fare well; fewer
than one-tenth of his 173 dissents were adopted as the opinions of the
Court.60 Therefore, if dissents are to be accepted in the regular course
ofjudicial decision-making, they must be justified by contemporary stan-
dards, not merely as an appeal to the future.
A dissenting opinion enunciates what Professor Unger refers to in a
different context as the "counter-principle" of the stated legal proposi-
tion. 6 ' A counter-principle represents the antithesis of the stated legal
position; the philosophical and jurisprudential consequences of the ma-
jority's reasoning.62 By enunciating the legal principle opposite the
court's opinion, the dissent provides a "vitalizing influence" 63 on the
law by adding a second dimension to the court's analysis. Even when a
dissent does not become the law, it spotlights the reasoning utilized by
the court by articulating the logically opposite legal principle. 6 4
57. Id. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
59. Id. at 318.
60. ZoBell, supra note 9, at 211.
61. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563, 618-33 (1983).
62. See id.
63. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 38, at 47.
64. See Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.AJ. 794 (1953).
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This function of dissent as a spotlight on the majority's reasoning
exists even where the dissent is not followed by the majority. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr65 helped illuminate the extension
of federal and judicial power that the majority's opinion represented.
Justice Black's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut 66 has helped frame the
terms of the "right to privacy" debate. And Justice Jackson's passionate
dissent in Korematsu v. United States6 7 stands as a grim reminder of how,
in times of national emergency, constitutional rights can become dan-
gerously imperiled.
Dissenting opinions provide a talisman of where the Court is head-
ing from which both the bench and bar can take their bearings in subse-
quent cases. If the legal principle enunciated by the Court survives the
criticism stated in the dissent, the Court's opinion is strengthened. Fu-
ture opinions are similarly enhanced by addressing and incorporating
the criticisms contained in a prior dissent. As Chief Justice Stone
explained:
A considered and well stated dissent sounds a warning note
that legal doctrine must not be pressed too far. It sometimes,
for better or for worse, arrests a trend and sometimes reverses
it. Its appeal can properly be only to scholarship, history and
reason, and if the business ofjudging is an intellectual process,
as we are entitled to believe that is its, it must be capable of
withstanding and surviving these critical tests.
6 8
III. JUDICIAL DISSENT AND ITS CRrrIcs
Dissenting opinions have been described as the enfant terrible of ap-
pellate practice.6 9 One judge opined that "[d]issents like homicide, fall
into three categories, excusable, justifiable and reprehensible." 70 An-
other writer has likened dissenting opinions to the weakling making
faces at the bully across the street from the protection of his front
porch.7 1 The most widespread argument against dissenting opinions,
however, is that they detract from the authority of the court.7 2 By pub-
licizing dissension, the dissenting judge airs the court's dirty laundry
before the public and undermining public confidence in the wisdom and
universality of the judicial process. As one commentator has argued:
65. 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black,J., dissenting).
67. 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
68. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 78
(1942).
69. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L. REV.
211, 218 (1957).
70. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 928 (1962) (quoting Hirt, In the
Matter of Dissents InterJudices deJure, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 256, 258 n.1 (1960).
71. Wollman, The Stability of the Law - The Income Tax Case, speech reprinted in Evils of
Dissenting Opinions, 57 ALB. L. REV. 74, 75 (1898).
72. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White,J.,
dissenting) ("The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is to
weaken the effect of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of confidence in
the conclusion of the courts of last resort.").
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The outstanding objection to the habit of dissent is that it
weakens and injures the Court with the public. It makes the
impression that the Court is not as able as it should be; not as
learned, not as wise, not as harmonious, and, therefore, not en-
titled to the full confidence which it should have, and that dis-
sentingjustices are too little inclined to subordinate themselves
in an effort to maintain the theoretical unity of the Court, and
the reverence and respect that ought to be felt toward the
Court.
73
Although compelling, this argument ultimately rests upon two
faulty premises. First, there exists such a thing as legal certainty. Sec-
ond, public confidence in the judicial process is aided by unanimous ju-
dicial opinions.
Usually, cases are governed by a settled rule of law which dictates
the result. Where the holding is not absolutely clear from statutory or
case law, settled canons of judicial construction usually can lead to the
appropriate result. However, occasionally judges are confronted with
cases which are not governed by a settled rule of law or controlled by a
particular canon of construction. Those cases must be decided by a pro-
cess ofjudicial reasoning from a legal principle. This involves an inher-
ent choice between competing principles, a choice necessarily governed
by values. 74 But as Dean Pound explained, "the process of valuing"
rests ultimately upon "the conception one has of the ideal relation
among men and of the ideal of a civilized human society."'7 5 In contem-
porary society such ideals are far from settled. Therefore, it is unrealis-
tic to expect the law to be settled and hold our legal certainty as an
obtainable goal.
7 6
Uncertainty in the law is not cause for alarm; it is endemic to demo-
cratic societies. As Justice Douglas explained, judicial dissent is merely
logical and natural in a democratic society:
77
When judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with
problems on which society itself is divided. It is the democratic
way to express dissident views. Judges are to be honored
rather than criticized for following that tradition, for proclaim-
ing their articles of faith so that all may read.
78
Dissenting opinions undeniably destroy the illusion of certainty in
the law, but the legitimacy of the judicial process ought not to rest upon
such illusions.79 Rather, the legitimacy of the judicial system must rest
upon the public's knowledge that judges have dispassionately consid-
ered the issue on the merits and conscientiously attempted to apply neu-
73. Moore, The Habit ofDissent, 8 VIa. L. REG. 338, 341 (1922).
74. See Pound, supra note 64, at 794.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32J. AM.JUDICATURE Soc'Y 104, 105
(1948) (In the words of Justice Douglas, "[P]hilosophers of the democratic faith will
rejoice in the uncertainty of the law and find strength and glory in it.").
78. Id. at 106.
79. Fuld, supra note 70, at 928.
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
tral legal principles to volatile and emotive factual settings. While
dissenting opinions may destroy illusions of judicial inviolability, they
provide assurance to the public that judicial decisions are not perfunc-
tory.8 0 As Chief Justice Hughes explained:
There are some who think it desirable that dissents should not
be disclosed as they detract from the force of the judgment.
Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity can be obtained with-
out sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends the decision
to public confidence. But unanimity which is merely formal,
which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is
not desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the ef-
fect upon public opinion at the time. This is so because what
must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the
character and independence of the judges. They are not there
simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they
should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they
cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should
be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be
secured through its sacrifice. 8 1
ChiefJustice Hughes' statement recalls the story of the circuit judge
who circulated a dissenting opinion to his colleagues on the panel after a
long period of advisement. The presiding judge acknowledged that the
case had given him much trouble and that he was not confident that his
vote at conference had been correct. He suggested to the dissenter:
"Why don't I reassign the opinion to you and we'll submit your dissent
as the opinion of the court." "Oh, no you don't," replied the dissenting
judge, "I only agreed to write a dissent. I never said I wanted my view
to become the law of the circuit!"
82
IV. THE LIMITS OF DIsSENT
Although dissenting opinions play an integral role in contemporary
jurisprudence, in limited cases the benefits of unanimity outweigh the
costs of stifling dissent. Such cases arise when the judicial branch, as a
governmental entity, finds its institutional prerogatives threatened by
potential encroachments from another branch of government. As Alex-
ander Hamilton understood, the judiciary is the least powerful branch of
government 83 and only can compel obedience through public accept-
ance of its legitimate authority. In those instances where the judiciary
finds its authority challenged by other branches of government or by
state authorities, it may be appropriate to strive for short-term unanim-
ity to preserve the independence of the judiciary over the long-term.
An analysis of some of the pathbreaking Supreme Court opinions
supports the proposition that unanimity may at times be important to
protect judicial authority. The first major decisions that helped establish
80. Stone, supra note 68, at 78.
81. Hughes, supra note 24, at 67-68.
82. See Pound, supra note 64, at 794 (relating story in different context).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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the structure of the federal government were all unanimous: Marbuy v.
Madison,8 4 McColloch v. Maryland 85 and Gibbons v. Ogden.8 6 It can hardly
be doubted that ChiefJustice Marshall's deft assumption ofjudicial and
federal power in these cases could have been accomplished in the ab-
sence of such unanimity. More recent judicial history also supports the
view that, when the court's authority is itself in question, unanimity is a
worthwhile goal to achieve. In Brown v. Board of Education,"7 the Court
anticipated that its decision would be met with widespread derision. Ac-
cordingly, Chief Justice Warren invoked his tremendous personal au-
thority among his brethren to 'produce a unanimous opinion
overturning the separate but equal doctrine.88 This unanimity was in-
fluential in winning public acceptance of such a dramatic change in the
national value pattern and in providing legal legitimation to the struggle
against the "massive resistance" of the southern states.8 9
Similarly, in United States v. Nixon 90 the Court was faced with a con-
stitutional conflict between the executive and the judiciary over whether
executive privilege protected the president from a court's subpoena
power. The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion resolved the opinion
in favor of the courts and helped diffuse the incipient constitutional cri-
sis. In the absence of judicial unanimity, it is quite possible that the
Watergate crisis would have been prolonged to the detriment of the
presidency and the nation.
Finally, judicial dissent should be exercised sparingly and only in
the case of a fundamental disagreement over principles underlying the
outcome of a particular case. Ajudge should not dissent merely because
he or she would have composed an opinion differently. Where the disa-
greement is not central to the disposition of the case, a judge should
exercise restraint and await a later case where the disagreement is more
squarely presented. As an integral component ofjudicial decision-mak-
ing, the institution of dissent should be exercised with the same care and
solicitude as any other component of judicial power. Only when spar-
ingly exercised can judicial dissent maintain its full persuasive power to
present and future generations.
CONCLUSION
By appreciating the historical role of dissent in the judicial process,
judges and lawyers should view dissenters, not as spoilers, but as jurists
fulfilling an important judicial function. While the rancor surrounding
the publication of dissents may disrupt the pristine image ofjudicial har-
mony, courts usually are able to weather the storms of discord and re-
turn to an even keel of collegiality. Ultimately, the mutual affection and
84. Supra note 18.
85. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
86. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
87. Supra note 43.
88. See W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 114-15 (1980).
89. A. BARTH, PROPHETS WrrH HONOR 51 (1974).
90. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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admiration among judges provides the best bulwark against lasting dis-
cord resulting from judicial dissent. As Lord Justice Asquith said of his
colleagues on the English Court of Appeal, "the members of this court
are such nice and accomplished men [and women] that it is almost a
pleasure to be dissented from by them!" 9 1
91. Fuld, supra note 70, at 929 (quoting Asquith, J., Some Aspects of the Work of the Court
of Appeals, J. SOC'Y PUBLIC TEACHERS OF L. 350, 353 (1950)).
[Vol. 68:1
